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Self-Determination, Justice, and a              
“Peace Process”:  
Irish Nationalism, the Contemporary Colonial 




In a sense, the “Irish peace process” is a success story, as it has largely 
achieved a shift from military/paramilitary violent conflict to political 
conflict, played out through democratic institutions. However, the 
perception that a peace has been achieved belies the fact that the meta-
conflict remains unresolved. This article engages with the Irish peace 
process in the context of the collective human right of self-determination. I 
argue that self-determination retains a mission of liberation in the twenty-
first century, particularly in relation to contemporary colonial cases, such as 
that of Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland. In this context, I explore the 
Irish peace accord, the Good Friday Agreement (“the Agreement”). While 
the Agreement has shifted the conflict largely into the realm of political 
debate, it has been less effective in promoting a peace that is grounded in 
justice. Indeed, some have recently argued that the people of Northern 
Ireland must choose between peace and justice. In this article, I question 
this proposed binary and argue that it is possible and worthwhile to pursue 
both justice and peace. An effective process of transitional justice for the 
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North of Ireland can acknowledge colonialism as well as its impacts in 
Ireland, and can promote self-determination. Such a process can provide the 
foundation for the Good Friday Agreement to be implemented in ways that 
promote not only an end to violent conflict, but a just and lasting peace. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 “In places torn by war, there is all too often a choice to be made 
between justice and peace. We may want both; we may cry out for 
both. But the bleak truth is, we cannot have both.” 
 Jonathan Freedland1 
“Peace” has a particular connotation in terms of the conflict between Irish 
nationalist efforts to achieve Irish unification, and British unionist efforts to 
maintain Northern Ireland as a province of the United Kingdom.2 In a sense, 
the Irish peace process is a success story, as it has largely achieved a shift 
from military/paramilitary violent conflict to political conflict, played out 
through democratic institutions.3 However, the perception that a peace has 
been achieved belies the fact that the meta-conflict remains unresolved. 
                                                                                                                              
1 Jonathan Freedland, Whatever Gerry Adams’ Past, Peace Takes Precedence over 
Justice, THE GUARDIAN, May 3, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 
2014/may/02/gerry-adams-jean-mcconville-south-africa-painful-compromise. 
2 In this article, I use the umbrella term “Irish nationalist” to refer to people and 
communities who seek the unification of the two Irish jurisdictions; Northern Ireland 
(currently a unit of the United Kingdom) and the Republic of Ireland (an independent 
state). I include in the term Irish nationalists those people who would also be identified as 
“Irish republicans,” a group that has historically been associated with a physical force 
tradition in Irish politics. I also use the umbrella term “British unionist” to refer to people 
and communities who seek to maintain the union between Northern Ireland and Great 
Britain. I include in this term those people who would also be identified as “British 
loyalists,” a term which has been used to identify more extreme elements in the unionist 
tradition, including members of the Orange Order and loyalist paramilitary groups. 
3 The primary institution is the Northern Ireland Assembly, a consociational parliament, 
which exercises some powers devolved from the central UK administration at 
Westminster. 
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That is, the parties to the conflict “disagree about what caused the 
conflict.”4 
Further, the peace as it stands in Northern Ireland has not been shaped by 
the notion of self-determination. Self-determination is a foundation 
principle in the international human rights framework. It is an emancipatory 
principle, which acknowledges the right of “peoples” to determine their 
own destinies in the political, economic, social, and cultural spheres. The 
exercise of self-determination peaked during the decolonisation5 period of 
the 1960s and 1970s. Some contemporary commentators assert, however, 
that self-determination has a limited role to play in international affairs in 
the twenty-first century.6 Therefore, despite the central position of self-
determination in the international human rights framework, there is a risk 
that decolonisation will come to be regarded as a historical phenomenon, 
rather than an ongoing imperative. Some contemporary hard cases in self-
determination, notably the case of Irish nationalists in the North of Ireland, 
have already been unjustifiably marginalised in international legal 
discourse. 
This article engages with matters of peace, law, and violence in the 
context of international law, particularly the collective human right of self-
determination. I argue that self-determination retains a mission of liberation 
in the twenty-first century, particularly in relation to contemporary colonial 
cases, such as that of Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland.7 The Irish 
                                                                                                                              
4 Christine Bell, et al., Justice Discourses in Transition, 13 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 305, 
316 (2004). 
5 Throughout this article, I use Australian English spelling rather than US English 
spelling. 
6 See, e.g., Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination 34 VA. J. OF INT’L L. 1, 31 
(1993); Noel Pearson, Uses of Layered Identities, WEEKEND AUSTL., Nov. 18, 2006, at 
28. 
7 “Northern Ireland” is the official term for the northeastern six counties of the island of 
Ireland, which is administered as a province of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland. The term “Northern Ireland” is often rejected by Irish nationalists 
living in that territory, in favour of terms such as “the North of Ireland” or “the Six 
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nationalist claim to self-determination is acknowledged in the central 
document of the Irish peace process, the Good Friday Agreement.8 Since its 
adoption in 1998, the Agreement has come to be widely accepted as the 
legal instrument essential to peaceful political progress in Ireland. 
The Agreement has succeeded in shifting the nature of the conflict in 
Ireland. As a legal institution, the Agreement has promoted peace and 
discouraged violence, shifting the conflict largely into the realm of political 
debate. However, the Agreement and its outworkings have been less 
effective in promoting a peace that is grounded in justice. The pursuit of 
justice in post-conflict societies is complicated by the need to frame the past 
and acknowledge the significance of past wrongs in order to achieve future 
goals.9 As noted above, Freedland recently argued that the people of post-
conflict societies must choose between peace and justice.10 In a similar 
recent comment, Clive Crook argued that Northern Ireland has a long way 
to go in the pursuit of post-conflict reconciliation, and that its people are 
obliged to settle for peace and truth without also aspiring to justice.11 
                                                                                                                              
Counties.” In this article, I use the terms “Northern Ireland” and “the North of Ireland” 
interchangeably, in order to acknowledge the competing nationalist identifications of the 
two main communities: Irish nationalists and British unionists. 
8 See generally Agreement Reached at Multi-Party Negotiations, Belfast, Apr. 10, 1998, 
Cm. 3883, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-belfast-
agreement (hereinafter Good Friday Agreement). The Good Friday Agreement is also 
commonly known as the Belfast Agreement. This power sharing accord is typically 
known to Irish nationalists in the north of Ireland as the ”Good Friday Agreement,” as it 
was signed on Good Friday in 1998. As with the terms “Northern Ireland” and “North of 
Ireland,” the language surrounding the agreement is contentious, with the ‘Good Friday’ 
usage suggesting an association with the Catholicism that is the religious context for the 
Irish nationalist community. In this article, I will generally use the phrase “the 
Agreement,” which is in common use in Ireland. 
9 Cillian McGrattan, Policing Politics: Framing the Past in Post-Conflict Divided 
Societies, 21 DEMOCRATIZATION 389, 390 (2014). 
10 Freedland, supra note 1. 
11 Clive Crook, Northern Ireland Can’t Have Peace and Justice, BLOOMBERG VIEW 
May 6, 2014, http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-05-06/northern-ireland-can-
t-have-both-peace-and-justice. 
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This proposed peace-justice binary presents particular challenges for 
those who have suffered the most in conflict, namely victims of violence. 
According to Graham Dawson, contradictions between peace processes and 
the desire for justice  
are especially acute for the victims of violence who, confronted by 
amnesty and other arrangements designed to draw perpetrators into 
a negotiated political settlement, may be forced to choose between 
the pursuit of justice and the securing of a peace settlement or the 
securing of information about the death of a loved one.12 
In this article, I question this peace-justice binary, to argue that it is both 
possible and worthwhile to simultaneously pursue justice and peace. I use 
the term justice in the context of transitional justice theory, a body of 
scholarship that focuses on the promotion of justice in post-conflict 
societies. I argue that analysis of the Irish nationalist claim to self-
determination is currently inadequate, and that this is a key limiting factor 
in the capacity of the Good Friday Agreement and its outworkings to 
promote both peace and justice. An effective process of transitional justice 
for the North of Ireland must acknowledge and address the Irish nationalist 
claim to self-determination and the colonial experience it emerges from. 
This can provide the foundation for the Agreement to be implemented in 
ways that promote not only an end to violent conflict, but also a just and 
lasting peace. 
In the remainder of this introduction, I explain the three key concepts in 
this article, namely (A) the right of self-determination, (B) peace, and (C) 
transitional justice. I also explain my methodology. In Part II, I argue that 
                                                                                                                              
12 Graham Dawson, The Desire for Justice, Psychic Reparation and the Politics of 
Memory in “Post-Conflict” Northern Ireland, 18 RETHINKING HIST.: J. OF THEORY & 
PRAC. 265, 266 (2014). See also generally MARIE BREEN SMYTH, TRUTH RECOVERY 
AND JUSTICE AFTER CONFLICT: MANAGING VIOLENT PASTS (2007); BRANDON 
HAMBER, TRANSFORMING SOCIETIES AFTER POLITICAL VIOLENCE: TRUTH, 
RECONCILIATION AND MENTAL HEALTH (2009). 
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self-determination retains a mission of liberation for Irish nationalists in 
Northern Ireland, whose circumstances evidence a contemporary colonial 
experience. In Part III, I introduce the Good Friday Agreement, and 
demonstrate that this peace accord acknowledges the legitimacy of the Irish 
nationalist self-determination claim. In Part IV, I explore how the 
Agreement has shifted the nature of the political conflict in Ireland, and 
argue that its capacity to promote a just peace must be continually and 
critically assessed. That capacity can be enhanced by attending to the 
requirements of transitional justice. 
A. The Right of Self-Determination 
The right of self-determination is enshrined in common Article 1 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR): “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of 
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development.”13 
Self-determination entails the right of a “people” to choose their own 
form of political organisation and relationship to other groups.14 However, 
self-determination goes beyond this “essence” of political control, to extend 
“full rights in the cultural, economic and political spheres.”15 The right 
represents the means for a people “to preserve its cultural, ethnic, historical, 
or territorial identity.”16 Self-determination is a foundation principle in the 
                                                                                                                              
13 G.A. Res 2200A (XXI), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/2200 (Dec. 16, 1966). The ICCPR and 
ICESCR are the core treaty sources of contemporary international human rights law. 
They are distinguished from other treaties by near-universal adoption by members of the 
international community. 
14 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 553 (6th ed. 2003). 
15 Patrick Thornberry, Self-Determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of 
International Instruments, 38 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 867, 880 (1989). 
16 Erica-Irene A. Daes, Some Considerations on the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-
Determination, 3 TRANSN’L L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 1, 4–5 (1993). 
Self-Determination, Justice, and a “Peace Process” 543 
VOLUME 13 • ISSUE 2 • 2014 
body of international human rights law, and the capacity of human beings to 
realise their individual human rights is closely tied to the degree to which 
their community exercises self-determination.17 
The right of self-determination has a revolutionary character, both in the 
sense that its origins may be traced to revolutionary movements, and in its 
capacity to revolutionise relationships between peoples and states.18 The 
principle of self-determination can be traced to the French and US 
revolutions.19 However, the principle of self-determination was most 
prominently engaged during the decolonisation era of the 1960s and 
1970s.20 During this era, colonised peoples around the globe seized upon 
the right of self-determination as a vehicle by which the mission of 
decolonisation, which Frantz Fanon and others described,21 could be 
achieved.22 In the twenty-first century, some have argued that self-
determination’s mission of decolonisation is almost or entirely complete.23 
However, some contemporary hard cases in self-determination have been 
unjustifiably marginalised in international legal discourse. Irish nationalists 
in Northern Ireland fall into a category of contemporary self-determination 
claimants who assert a colonial experience, but do not meet the archaic 
                                                                                                                              
17 Héctor Gros Espiell, The Right to Self-Determination: Implementation of United 
Nations Resolutions, ¶ 59, United Nations, E/CN.4/Sub.2/405 (1980); S. JAMES ANAYA, 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 77 ( 1996). 
18 Thornberry, supra note 15. Thornberry refers to self-determination as a “concept of 
liberation.” 
19 ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 11 
(1995). 
20 ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 196 (2004). 
21 FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 41 (Constance Farrington trans., 
1965). 
22 Many of these peoples asserted independent statehood through the trusteeship system 
of the United Nations. The United Nations records the changes in sovereignty in over 80 
former trust and non-self-governing territories. See UNITED NATIONS, TRUST AND NON-
SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES, 1945–1999 (1999), available at http://www.un.org/ 
en/decolonization/nonselfgov.shtml. 
23 See, e.g., Hannum, supra note 6, at 31; Pearson, supra note 6. 
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“salt-water” test24 of colonialism. Contemporary legal commentators have 
recognised that this test, which aimed to impose predictability by ruling out 
claims from peoples not separated by an ocean from their colonisers, was 
and remains manifestly unjust.25 
B. Peace: Settlement, Resolution, or Reconciliation? 
The Irish peace process demonstrates that the meaning of “peace” is 
contingent and context-dependent. Herbert Kelman identifies three different 
ways in which violent conflict between identity groups can be brought to an 
end. The first, conflict settlement, produces agreements (brokered by third 
parties) that meet the interests of parties “to the extent that their respective 
power positions enable them to prevail.”26 Public support may be based on a 
desire for the end of violent conflict but may “not rest in any particular 
change in public attitudes toward the adversary.”27 The second, conflict 
resolution, moves beyond settlement to change the relationship between 
parties, diluting the influence of power or required surveillance in 
agreement-making, and encouraging the building of trust and new 
understandings of the other.28 The third and final step beyond conflict 
resolution, and the “interactive problem-solving framework” resolution can 
create, is reconciliation. Good agreements can be tested by their capacity to 
                                                                                                                              
24 The “salt-water” test of colonialism required a colonial territory and people to be 
geographically and ethnically distinct from the colonising power. 
25 Andrew Hurrell, International Law and the Making and Unmaking of Boundaries, in 
STATES, NATIONS AND BORDERS: THE ETHICS OF MAKING BOUNDARIES 275, 292 
(Allen E. Buchanan & Margaret Moore eds., 2003); David Wippman, Introduction: 
Ethnic Claims and International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC CONFLICT 
1, 11 (David Wippman ed., 1998). 
26 Herbert C. Kelman, Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation: A Social-Psychological 
Perspective on Ending Violent Conflict Between Identity Groups, 1 LANDSCAPES OF 
VIOLENCE: AN INTERDISC. J. DEVOTED TO STUDY VIOLENCE, CONFLICT, & TRAUMA 1, 
1 (2010). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 2. 
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enable reconciliation (as a process that evolves over time).29 Reconciliation 
is the most challenging form of peace to achieve, as it requires identity 
change “by removing the negation of the other as a central component of 
one’s own identity.”30 
The Good Friday Agreement was, at least in part, an outcome of the 
lengthy campaign of resistance mounted by Irish nationalists against the 
British state and its administration of Northern Ireland. Indeed, one Sinn 
Féin Member of Parliament in the Northern Ireland Assembly, Martina 
Anderson, depicted Irish nationalism as a struggle against colonialism.31  
The Agreement and its outworkings have achieved a shift from violent and 
militarised political conflict to (largely) non-violent political conflict. There 
are few who would argue against the legitimacy of this transition, 
particularly considering the resounding popular support for the Good Friday 
Agreement as expressed in referenda in both Irish jurisdictions.32 On July 
28, 2005, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), a key protagonist 
of the “physical-force” Irish Republican movement, declared an end to its 
armed campaign.33 In its statement, the IRA concluded that the objective of 
Irish unity could and would be advanced by “purely political and 
democratic programmes” and “exclusively peaceful means,” noting the 
“compelling imperative on all sides to build a just and lasting peace.”34 In 
                                                                                                                              
29 Id. at 3. 
30 Id. at 4. 
31 Interview with Martina Anderson, Sinn Féin Director of Unionist Engagement, in 
Belfast (Mar. 21, 2006). Martina Anderson is an Irish nationalist politician, sitting in the 
Northern Ireland Assembly for Sinn Féin, and a former Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
Volunteer and prisoner. 
32 Some dissident Irish republican groupings remain active in Ireland and assert the 
illegitimacy of the Good Friday Agreement and related institutions. 
33 Irish Republican Army, Statement on the Ending of the Armed Campaign, CAIN Web 
Service (Jul. 25, 2005), available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/ira/ira280705 
.htm. 
34 Id. 
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this context, legitimate resistance ought to now be characterised as non-
violent political activity. 
However, there is a risk in Ireland that the peace process subsumes the 
underlying and unresolved political conflict between the competing visions 
for the territory’s future held by Irish nationalists, British unionists, and the 
two sovereign states of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. If 
“peace” marginalizes legitimate resistance to colonialism, then it will not 
produce justice in the sense of self-determination and, over time, it may 
trigger a resurgence in violent conflict. In this context, proactive evaluation 
of the Agreement and what it can deliver serves the interests of justice and 
self-determination.  
C. Transitional Justice 
Transitional justice is a set of scholarly enquiries concerned with the 
emergence of societies from violent conflict.35 According to Christine Bell, 
Colm Campbell, and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, “‘transitional justice’ 
encompasses the legal, moral and political dilemmas that arise in holding 
human rights abusers accountable at the end of conflict.”36 Studies in 
transitional justice can provide corrective and redemptive visions for justice 
after conflict, with their foci on human rights serving to mediate political 
divides.37 Transitional justice enquiries have frequently reflected on the 
post-conflict circumstances of Northern Ireland.38 These enquiries can assist 
in exploring the potential of the Good Friday Agreement, due to their focus 
on the capacity of law and legal institutions to contribute to social 
transformations. Indeed, the Agreement contains a number of provisions 
that could be helpful in developing transitional justice—for example, those 
                                                                                                                              
35 Alex Boraine, Transitional Justice as an Emerging Field, 5 (Repairing the Past: 
Reparations and Transitions to Democracy, Conference Paper, Mar. 2004). 
36 Bell et al., supra note 4, at 305. 
37 RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 228 (2000). 
38 I will discuss several of these in more detail in Part IV(i) of this article, below. 
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that require reform of policing, criminal justice, victims’ rights, human 
rights, and the release of paramilitary prisoners.39 
As noted above, I advocate for the development of a peace in the North 
of Ireland that encompasses—rather than marginalises—a concern for 
justice. This position has been strongly asserted by community-based peace 
movements in Northern Ireland over many years. For example, former 
leader of the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, Monica McWilliams, 
wrote in 1995 of women’s “struggle for peace and justice.”40 McWilliams 
cited Oonagh Marron, an organiser of the 1994 Clár na mBan41 conference 
under the theme “A Woman’s Agenda for Peace”: “It is up to us in the 
women’s movement to build an undeniable force, to maintain the pressure 
that will ensure that when the politicians talk of peace they mean peace with 
justice.”42 
This article positions self-determination in relation to both the Irish peace 
process (particularly through the lens of the Good Friday Agreement) and 
transitional justice theory. In the North of Ireland, self-determination can 
serve as the glue that binds the notions of peace and justice, and informs a 
peace process capable of achieving reconciliation over time, rather than 
mere settlement of violent conflict. 
                                                                                                                              
39 Campbell, et al., The Frontiers of Legal Analysis: Reframing the Transition in 
Northern Ireland, 66 MODERN L. REV. 317, 338 (2003). 
40 Monica McWilliams, Struggling for Peace and Justice: Reflections on Women’s 
Activism in Northern Ireland, 6 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 13, 32 (1995). 
41 An Irish phrase meaning “women’s agenda.” 
42 Oonagh Marron, The Cost of Silencing Voices Like Mine, in UNFINISHED 
REVOLUTION: ESSAYS ON THE IRISH WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 38–42 (Fran Devaney et al. 
eds., 1989), quoted in Monica McWilliams, Struggling for Peace and Justice: Reflections 
on Women’s Activism in Northern Ireland, 6 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 13, 32 (1995). 
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D. Methodology 
I have provided a more detailed explanation of my methodology 
elsewhere.43 This article draws on a combination of doctrinal legal research 
and qualitative socio-legal research, with particular emphasis on data 
gathered through in-depth research interviews with 14 participants in 
Ireland. Analyses of self-determination have typically been highly doctrinal, 
and have not followed a bottom-up approach to exploring the justifications 
or claims advanced by individual members of claimant groups. In this 
article, I privilege the experiences and aspirations of rights claimants to 
“talk back” to international law. In doing so, I critique the colonial origins 
and biases of the international legal system. 
Research participants in this study were targeted due to their experiences 
and expertise in self-determination, ensuring that all participants 
approached the research project from an informed position and delivered 
“information-rich” data through the interviews.44 In the first footnote 
referring to each participant, I include a brief statement of his or her 
relevant background and/or professional role in relation to the research. 
Qualitative research does not seek to make claims of generality,45 but rather 
seeks to show valid and reliable connections between the data and the 
analysis.46 In the research on which this article is based, I grounded my 
findings in the meanings expressed by interview participants by using the 
                                                                                                                              
43 Amy Maguire, Contemporary Anti-Colonial Self-Determination Claims and the 
Decolonisation of International Law, 22 GRIFFITH L. REV. 238, 242–46 (2013). 
44 Jamie Baxter & John Eyles, Evaluating Qualitative Research in Social Geography: 
Establishing ‘Rigour’ in Interview Analysis, 22 TRANSACTIONS OF INST. OF BRIT. 
GEOGRAPHERS 505, 513 (1997). 
45 Ann Chih Lin, Bridging Positivist and Interpretivist Approaches to Qualitative 
Methods, 26 POL’Y STUD. J. 162, 163 (1998). 
46 Baxter & Eyles, supra note 44, at 512. 
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constant comparison method,47 coding frequently raised concepts and using 
direct quotations from transcripts. 
In this article, I focus on the theme that emerged from data analysis as the 
core variable, namely, the contemporary colonial experience of Irish 
nationalists in Northern Ireland and the influence of that experience on their 
self-determination claims. This core variable recurs frequently throughout 
the data, links various data, becomes more detailed through constant 
comparison, and has significance in theory generation.48 The core variable 
of colonialism, as discussed by interview participants, drew together the 
other themes raised in interviews “to form an explanatory whole.”49 The 
perspectives of these interviewees on colonialism and the contemporary 
Irish nationalist claim to self-determination echo Malcolm X’s assertion: 
“You can’t separate peace from freedom, because no one can be at peace 
unless he has his freedom.”50 In contemporary, multi-cultural Ireland, 
however, the parallel imperative is to ensure that the pursuit of freedom 
does not threaten the peace that has been painstakingly negotiated. 
Throughout this article, I ask whether the Good Friday Agreement can 
promote both peace and justice through self-determination. 
                                                                                                                              
47 The process of constant comparison involves constantly comparing data and emerging 
analysis to generate a theory. See BARNEY GLASER & ANSELM STRAUSS, THE 
DISCOVERY OF GROUNDED THEORY: STRATEGIES FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 104 
(1967). 
48 Michelle Byrne, Grounded Theory as a Qualitative Research Methodology, 73 ASS’N 
OF OPERATING ROOM NURSES J. 1155, 1155 (2001). “Theory generation” refers to the 
use of constant comparison and the deep analysis of data to lift data beyond its basic 
meanings and to develop abstract theoretical conclusions. See Roy Suddaby, From the 
Editors: What Grounded Theory Is Not, 49 ACAD. OF MGMNT J. 633, 636 (2006). 
49 ANSELM STRAUSS & JULIET CORBIN, BASICS OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: 
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING GROUNDED THEORY 146 (1998). 
50 Malcolm X, Speech in New York City, “Prospects for Freedom in 1965” (Jan. 7, 
1965), in MALCOLM X SPEAKS: SELECTED SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS 147 (1965). 
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II. SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE MISSION OF LIBERATION IN 
IRELAND 
A. The Meaning of Self-determination from Irish Nationalist 
Perspectives 
In this section, I briefly consider some of the Irish interviewees’ 
perspectives on the meaning of the right of self-determination. This 
provides context for the subsequent exploration of the contemporary 
colonial experience of Irish nationalists in the North of Ireland. All 14 
participants accepted the international legal definition of the right as a 
starting point, and each then went on to apply the definition in practical 
terms. For example, Bríd Rodgers acknowledged the independence aspect 
of self-determination, but went on to note that this aspect of the right is 
complicated in the Irish context: 
The issue [in Ireland] is that there are two sets of people on the 
island who see self-determination differently. The only way to 
solve that is to get to a context where you accept the legitimacy of 
both, but you provide a context where they can work together, and 
eventually heal, and move on to self-determination.51 
Paul O’Connor agreed that all of the people of the island of Ireland are 
entitled to decide their destiny together.52 
To Eoin Ó Broin, self-determination operates on three levels: the nation, 
the community, and the individual. Along with balancing these three “sites” 
of self-determination, he argued that the right must also be balanced with 
                                                                                                                              
51 Interview with Bríd Rodgers, Social Democratic and Labour Party (hereinafter 
SDLP), Lurgan, Ireland (Mar. 9, 2006). Bríd Rodgers was one of the first Ministers in the 
devolved Northern Ireland Executive, elected for the Social Democratic and Labour Party 
(SDLP), a centrist Irish nationalist party, and a founding activist in the civil rights 
movement. 
52 Interview with Paul O’Connor, Pat Finucane Centre, Derry, Ireland (Mar. 2, 2006). 
Paul O’Connor is an Irish nationalist human rights activist, based at the Pat Finucane 
Centre in Derry, which represents the families of victims of conflict in their efforts to 
gain justice and truth. 
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social, economic, political, and cultural rights.53 Both O’Connor and Terry 
Enright emphasised the importance of social and cultural freedom as 
aspects of self-determination.54 Essential to this multi-faceted conception of 
self-determination is the notion of inclusion in governance. Anthony 
Coughlan acknowledged that self-determination has been traditionally 
understood to refer to independent statehood, but explained that “it also 
refers to the state you’re in, and whether it respects your culture and 
language, and right to a . . . standard of living, access to jobs, freedom from 
discrimination.”55 
Another common theme among participants was that self-determination 
has to be interpreted on a community level if it is to mean anything to 
claimants. According to Margaret Ward,  
I think it has to start with people’s lived reality—what difference 
will it make to their lives? If they can’t be convinced on that then 
that kind of high-level objective wouldn’t move them.56 
Ó Broin also emphasised the community aspect of self-determination, 
arguing that the right must be primarily concerned with community-based 
activism, empowerment, and engagement on issues affecting people in their 
everyday lives.57 Niall Murphy provided an example of community 
                                                                                                                              
53 Interview with Eoin Ó Broin, Sinn Féin, Belfast, Ireland (Jan. 24, 2006). Eoin Ó Broin 
is an Irish nationalist political activist and writer. 
54 Interview with Paul O’Connor, supra note 52; Interview with Terry Enright, Human 
Rights Consortium, Belfast, Ireland (Feb. 2, 2006). The late Terry Enright was a member 
of the Irish nationalist community in Belfast, and a long-time community worker and 
human rights activist. 
55 Interview with Anthony Coughlan, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland (Mar. 3, 2006). 
Anthony Coughlan is an Irish former academic, and a commentator on Irish engagement 
with Europe. 
56 Interview with Margaret Ward, Women’s Res. & Dev. Agency, Belfast, Ireland (Jan. 
29, 2006). Margaret Ward is an Irish historian and human rights activist, and Director of 
the Women’s Research and Development Agency, an organisation situated in Belfast and 
dedicated to the promotion of women’s equality and rights. 
57 Interview with Eoin Ó Broin, supra note 53. 
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engagement with self-determination through the Gaelic Athletic 
Association, which he described as a custodian of Irish cultural pursuits.58 
However, several respondents concluded that Irish self-determination has 
failed to gain traction as an international legal issue. The right faces two 
major obstacles in this context: first, Britain’s international status and its 
capacity to shape the “Irish question” as a domestic political problem,59 and 
second, the lack of international advocacy on the part of the Irish state.60 
Consequently, academic and political commentary has failed to adequately 
acknowledge the effects of colonialism on Irish nationalists.61 Those who 
have attempted to expose the colonial legacy of British imperialism in 
Ireland have been left “without a paradigm to explain inequality, injustice 
and repression within the North of Ireland.”62 
                                                                                                                              
58 Interview with Niall Murphy, Kevin R. Winters & Co. Solicitors, Belfast, Northern 
Ireland (Mar. 15, 2006). Niall Murphy is a member of the Irish nationalist community, 
and a legal practitioner in Belfast, specialising in human rights. 
59 Interview with Professor Christine Bell, Transitional Justice Institute, University of 
Ulster, Derry, Northern Ireland (Oct. 27, 2005). Christine Bell is a legal academic 
specialising in the study of transitional justice, with origins in the British unionist 
community in Northern Ireland. Interview with Anthony Coughlan, supra note 55. 
Interview with Terry Enright, supra note 54. Interview with Eoin Ó Broin, supra note 53. 
Interview with Mike Ritchie, Coiste na n-Iarchimí, Belfast, Ireland (Dec. 7, 2005). Mike 
Ritchie is a community worker, who represents former Irish republican political 
prisoners. 
60 Interview with Professor Kieran McEvoy, Queens University Belfast, Belfast, Ireland 
(Jun. 22, 2006). McEvoy is a legal academic and criminologist, with particular expertise 
in relation to political imprisonment. McEvoy is also a long-time committee member of 
the Committee for the Administration of Justice, a prominent human rights NGO in 
Belfast. 
61 Pamela Clayton, Religion, Ethnicity and Colonialism as Explanations of the Northern 
Ireland Conflict, in RETHINKING NORTHERN IRELAND 40, 48 (David Miller ed. 1998). 
62 Robbie McVeigh, The British/Irish “Peace Process” and the Colonial Legacy, in 
DIS/AGREEING IRELAND: CONTEXTS, OBSTACLES, HOPES 27, 28 (James Anderson & 
James Goodman eds., 1998). 
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B. Aspects of the Historical and Contemporary Irish Nationalist 
Experience of Colonialism 
In this section, I briefly explore some aspects of the historical and 
contemporary Irish nationalist experience of colonialism through the lens of 
three themes that emerged from my qualitative research—namely, the 
nature of British administration in Northern Ireland, social imperialism and 
the colonial mindset, and the suppression of Irish culture. The data from 
which these themes emerged support the conclusion that self-determination 
retains a contemporary mission of decolonisation, and that self-
determination for Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland requires renewed 
critical evaluation. This section also provides context for Section IV of this 
article. In that section, I argue that, in order to ensure the capacity of the 
Agreement to promote a just peace, it is essential to acknowledge 
contextual matters of colonialism and self-determination. 
Advocates for Irish self-determination have typically avoided the 
international legal forum as a site for advancing self-determination claims.63 
This is noteworthy because international recognition can significantly assist 
claimants in asserting and exercising their right to self-determination. It can, 
for instance, enable claimants to bolster their claims by referring to 
comparable situations in their advocacy.64 It can also develop a broader 
support base and provide a much wider range of fora for advancing a self-
                                                                                                                              
63 Interview with Eoin Ó Broin, supra note 53. 
64 Interview with Professor Robert McCorquodale, University of Nottingham, 
Nottingham, UK (Mar. 27, 2006). Robert McCorquodale participated in this research 
during the process of interviews relating to the self-determination claims of Irish 
nationalists in Northern Ireland. His academic writings are also cited extensively in this 
article. McCorquodale is not a member of either major community in Ireland, nor is he 
engaged in a self-determination claim there. He was interviewed on the basis of his 
expertise in self-determination as a professor of international law, with particular focus 
on Britain’s engagement with the right. In this sense, McCorquodale’s participation in 
this research is similar to that of Professor Christine Bell, another non-claimant 
interviewee, whose expertise has been considered through both her comments in our 
interview and her written work. 
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determination claim. Had Ireland been recognised more widely as a site of 
colonialism, advocates may have been able to build on what Adrian Guelke 
recognised as the lack of international legitimacy of Northern Ireland as a 
political entity.65 Instead, the continued colonial experience of Irish 
nationalists in the North of Ireland, and their right to self-determination, has 
been under-explored and under-theorised in legal discourse. 
In arguing that colonialism relates not to distance, as in the salt-water 
archetype of colonialism, but rather to the form of administration, Robert 
McCorquodale asked, “Is the type of administration a foreign 
administration over those who are different and who don’t share the same 
approach?”66 The use of the term “foreign” is complicated in the Northern 
Irish context, because over half of the constituents of that jurisdiction 
identify themselves as British, “Northern Irish,” or “Ulstermen,” and remain 
accepting of British governance. For Irish nationalists and interviewees in 
this research, however, British rule is both a foreign and different approach 
from how they imagine governance if Ireland were unified. 
Like McCorquodale, Bernadette McAliskey rejected the salt-water 
approach to colonial categorisation, finding that the British presence in 
Ireland has never been appropriately named as colonial, due to the 
erroneous perception that colonies must be distant from the imperial 
power.67 Further, several participants in this study identified the 
unaccountability of the British ruling class as a key signifier of continued 
colonialism. Coughlan stated, “the classic characterisation of colonialism 
was a subordinate people who had their laws made by others . . . and Britain 
                                                                                                                              
65 Adrian Guelke, International Legitimacy, Self-Determination and Northern Ireland, 
11 REV. OF INT’L STUD. 37, 38 (1985). 
66 Interview with Professor Robert McCorquodale, supra note 64. 
67 Interview with Bernadette McAliskey, South Tyrone Empowerment Program, 
Dungannon, Northern Ireland (Jun. 7, 2006). Bernadette McAliskey is an Irish republican 
and socialist activist and former politician, who continues to contribute to public debate 
on the Irish national question and directs the South Tyrone Empowerment Program, 
supporting migrant workers. 
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does still do that in Northern Ireland.”68 Enright was more explicit in his 
condemnation of the unaccountable and distant ruling class of British 
politicians and bureaucrats primarily responsible for the governance of 
Northern Ireland: “[T]hose people are like a secret society, behind closed 
doors, who still think of us as the natives and still think that the natives have 
to be told how to live and what to do.”69 For Irish nationalists, self-
determination would require governance that is accountable and 
representative, rather than continued dominance by history’s greatest 
imperial power. 
Notwithstanding the recent devolution of some powers to a power-
sharing government in Belfast,70 some participants in this study identified 
continued social imperialism as another vestige of colonialism. Northern 
Ireland as a quasi-state was constructed for the benefit of its British unionist 
population, who for most of its history, have dominated in a broad range of 
social fields.71 Ó Broin argued that the legacy of unionist dominance in the 
North of Ireland has been the creation of a class of people who “benefited 
from the dividends of imperialism,” such as powerful politicians, 
professionals, and workers who were able to gain reliable employment in 
the shipyards and factories.72 Meanwhile, Irish nationalists in the North 
                                                                                                                              
68 Interview with Anthony Coughlan, supra note 55. I note that this assessment remains 
accurate, even though some law-making capacity has been devolved to the Northern 
Ireland Assembly. 
69 Interview with Terry Enright, supra note 54. 
70 The Northern Ireland Assembly exercises devolved powers in the areas of agriculture, 
culture, education, employment, trade, environment, finance, health, social services and, 
since 2010, has power over policing and justice. Devolution Settlement: Northern 
Ireland, GOV.UK (Feb. 20, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/devolution-settlement-northern-
ireland.  
71 Christine Bell & Kathleen Cavanaugh, “Constructive Ambiguity” or Internal Self-
Determination? Self-Determination, Group Accommodation, and the Belfast Agreement, 
22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1345, 1351 (1998). 
72 Interview with Eoin Ó Broin, supra note 53. 
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have suffered marginalisation and discrimination in all aspects of social 
life.73 
O’Connor developed this argument further, finding that anti-Catholic 
sentiment and sectarian conflict has been used to justify British imperialism 
in Ireland. O’Connor perceived a legacy of the superiority of one group 
over another as a continuing symptom of colonialism:  
You cannot take people out of their homes, kill them, starve them, 
treat them like shit, for centuries, unless you had something in your 
head which told you that they were somehow less than you. You 
used religion to do it here, and you use race elsewhere.74 
It is clear from such perspectives of the colonised that, whatever future 
political settlements might be made, self-determination in Ireland must be 
asserted on the basis that all the people of the island have equal entitlement 
to rights and recognition. 
A further aspect of continued colonial influence identified by Irish 
participants in this study was the dominance of British culture over Irish 
culture within many areas of social life. O’Connor gave the example of the 
use of British points of reference, such as Big Ben, in the textbooks used by 
children in schools. For O’Connor’s children, famous sites in London have 
no cultural relevance,75 and they would be better served by education that 
reflects their Irish identities. As was recognised by Murphy, some of the 
key areas in which Irish people assert self-determination lie within the 
cultural sphere. In promoting the use of the Irish language, and supporting 
Gaelic sports, people claim their cultural identity.76 Often, though, the 
British and devolved Northern Irish administrations either fail to support or 
                                                                                                                              
73 TIM PAT COOGAN, IRELAND IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 125 (2003); MICHAEL 
FARRELL, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE ORANGE STATE 326 (2nd ed. 1976). 
74 Interview with Paul O’Connor, supra note 52. 
75 Id. 
76 Interview with Niall Murphy, supra note 58. 
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actively discourage the practice of Irish culture.77 The suppression of Irish 
culture reflects and reinforces the continued influence of colonialism, 
particularly the notion of the superiority of the colonial culture over the 
culture of the colonised. More broadly, testimonies from Irish research 
participants in relation to self-determination demonstrate the need to 
critically evaluate the Irish peace accord, the Good Friday Agreement, in 
the context of the contemporary colonial experience. 
III. THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT AND SELF-DETERMINATION 
IN IRELAND 
As noted above, the self-determination claim of Irish nationalists in the 
North of Ireland has not gained traction as an international legal issue, in 
part because of the United Kingdom’s capacity to depict the matter as a 
domestic political and inter-communal problem. I have argued that it is 
essential to expose the contemporary colonial experience of nationalists in 
the North of Ireland in order to examine Irish self-determination with an 
honest acknowledgment of context. The other essential contextual factor in 
relation to contemporary self-determination in Ireland is the Good Friday 
Agreement. In this section, I explore the significance of the Agreement in 
relation to self-determination, with emphasis on the key provisions of the 
                                                                                                                              
77 This is especially apparent currently in relation to the legal protection of the rights of 
Irish speakers in Northern Ireland. The British Government committed to the passage of 
an Irish Language Act in the St. Andrews Agreement (an Agreement clarifying aspects of 
the peace process and devolved government), but has not met this commitment. 
Agreement at St Andrews, Ir.-Gr. Brit., Annex B, Oct. 19, 2006, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136651/st_
andrews_agreement-2.pdf. The British unionist parties in the Northern Ireland Assembly 
have prevented the passage of an Irish Language Act through that parliament, with 
George Robinson of the Democratic Unionist Party describing the Irish language as 
“closely identified with IRA terrorism,” and Ulster Unionist David Kennedy arguing that 
the nationalist party Sinn Féin use the Irish language “as a kind of warped ideological 
jihad.” N. IR. ASSEMBLY OFF. REP. (Oct. 9, 2007)(statements of Mr. G. Robinson and 
Mr. Kennedy), available at http://archive.niassembly.gov.uk/record/reports2007/0710 
09.htm. 
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Agreement and its status as a transitional instrument. In the years ahead, the 
Agreement must be continually analysed in terms of its capacity to promote 
self-determination. 
A. The Value of the Good Friday Agreement in Building Self-
Determination 
During the recent conflict in the North of Ireland, several attempts at 
securing lasting peace were thwarted or abandoned. The Good Friday 
Agreement received mass public support throughout Ireland when it was 
made.78 In the challenging years since its acceptance at referenda, the 
Agreement has not been abandoned by any of the mainstream political 
parties. In fact, the Democratic Unionist Party, which rejected the 
Agreement at the time of negotiations, is now the largest party in the 
consociational79 parliament established under the Agreement. The 
Agreement is generally accepted as the foundation of political progress in 
Northern Ireland, and between the Irish jurisdictions and the Irish and 
British states. I argue that the Agreement can also facilitate transitional 
justice in Ireland by taking into account the demands of the right to self-
determination. 
General consensus on the importance of the Agreement among political 
leaders was demonstrated in March 2009, when dissident Irish republicans80 
                                                                                                                              
78 In Northern Ireland, 71.1 percent of voters answered “yes” to the referendum question: 
“Do you support the Agreement reached at the multi-party talks on Northern Ireland and 
set out in command paper 3833?” In the Republic of Ireland, 94.4 percent of voters 
agreed to a change to the Irish Constitution, to enable the operation of the Agreement. 
Nicholas Whyte, Northern Ireland Elections: The 1998 Referendums, ARK (Feb. 17, 
2002), http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/fref98.htm. 
79 Consociational government is a model that guarantees group representation in political 
institutions and seeks to avoid majority dominance. It was adopted in Northern Ireland as 
a suitable model for enabling political transition following inter-communal conflict. 
80 “Dissident” is a commonly used phrase to describe Irish republican militants and 
political activists who dissent from the recent shift in Irish republicanism towards purely 
political activism, and its associated compromises. 
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claimed responsibility for the shooting deaths of two British soldiers in 
Antrim and a policeman in Craigavon, two towns outside Belfast.81 These 
events raised fears of a severe threat to the peace process. Unionist and 
nationalist political leaders united in their condemnation of the threat. Then 
British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Shaun Woodward, called the 
peace process “unstoppable.”82 Deputy Chief Minister of the Northern 
Ireland Assembly, Martin McGuinness of Sinn Féin, made a particularly 
strong statement. McGuinness was previously an IRA commander and 
supporter of the political war against the British occupation of the North of 
Ireland. However, he said: “[T]hese people [the gunmen] are traitors to the 
island of Ireland; they have betrayed the political desires, hopes and 
aspirations of all of the people who live on this island. They don’t deserve 
to be supported by anyone.”83 
The political leaders’ desperation to preserve the peace at this time 
proves their belief that the Agreement is an instrument that is too essential 
to peaceful progress to be abandoned. Indeed, according to journalist John 
Ware, the fact that British unionist politicians declined an opportunity to 
use the killings for political mileage against their nationalist opponents 
“suggests the peace process is going from strength to strength.”84 
In May 2014, this conclusion was tested by the four-day arrest and 
detainment of Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams by the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland for questioning in relation to the 1972 abduction and 
murder of Belfast mother Jean McConville. His arrest raised concerns 
                                                                                                                              
81 Henry McDonald, “Real IRA Claims’ Murder of Soldiers in Northern Ireland, THE 
GUARDIAN, Mar. 9, 2009, http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/mar/08/northern-ireland-
soldiers-killed-antrim. 
82 Arrests Over NI Policeman Murder, BBC NEWS (Mar. 10 2009, 3:11 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/7935394.stm. 
83 Id. 
84 John Ware, Real IRA Hits Back at the Heretics, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Mar. 12, 
2009, http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/real-ira-hits-back-at-the-heretics-20090311-
8v53.html?skin=text-only. 
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regarding the stability of the peace process, particularly in light of 
comments from other Sinn Féin members that the timing of the arrest was 
politically motivated, with European parliament and local government 
elections approaching. Martin McGuinness was quoted as saying that “dark 
forces” opposed to the peace process continued to operate within the Police 
Service of Northern Ireland, and that Sinn Féin would have to review its 
support for the police if Adams was charged.85 The arrest of Adams was 
controversial, particularly because it highlighted two issues that continue to 
divide public opinion: “the pardoning of militants, and the confidence of all 
sides in the neutrality of the police.”86 Adams himself, following his release, 
maintained his innocence, stated his continued support for “civic, 
accountable, public service policing”87 and his resolve to continue to “build 
the peace.”88 He said that “there can be no going back—peace needs to be 
built with a consistent and determined focus.”89 Such responses to recent 
major threats to peace in the North of Ireland demonstrate the centrality of 
the Good Friday Agreement—and its machinery of peace—in the political 
outlook of representatives from both Irish nationalist and British unionist 
perspectives. 
                                                                                                                              
85 Gerry Adams Arrested: PSNI to Ask for More Time to Quiz Sinn Fein Leader over 
Jean McConville’s Murder, BELFAST TELEGRAPH, May 2, 2014, http://www.belfast 
telegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/northern-ireland/gerry-adams-arrested-psni-to-ask-
for-more-time-to-quiz-sinn-fein-leader-over-jean-mcconvilles-murder-30239136.html. 
86 Padraic Halpin, Gerry Adams Walks Free Following McConville Murder Probe, 
REUTERS ONLINE, (May 4, 2014, 7:41 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/ 
05/04/us-northernireland-adams-idUSBREA4302H20140504. 
87 Gerry Adams, The Jean McConville Killing: I’m Completely Innocent. But What Were 
My Accusers’ Motives?, THE GUARDIAN, May 8, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2014/may/07/jean-mcconville-killing-gerry-adams-innocent-accusers. 
88 Gerry Adams Walks Free Following McConville Murder Probe, REUTERS, (May 4, 
2014), http://www.reuters.com/video/2014/05/04/gerry-adams-walks-free-following-
mcconvi?videoId=312826364. 
89 Gerry Adams Press Conference, BBC NI (May 4, 2014), available at https://ww 
w.youtube.com/watch?v=qxcgDT8A4lQ. 
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Commentators from a wide range of perspectives have repeatedly 
described the Good Friday Agreement as immensely significant. According 
to Colin Harvey, the Agreement is “constitutive” and must underpin all 
future constitutional developments in Northern Ireland.90 Former Taoiseach 
(Irish Prime Minister) Bertie Ahern regarded the Agreement as “truly 
historic” because it was the first time since 1918 that “the people of Ireland 
voted on the same day to determine the future of the entire island.”91 Bell 
and Cavanaugh assert that, while the Agreement is filled with “constructive 
ambiguities” designed to facilitate the settlement, the vote of the people of 
the island in favour of it could be argued to be an exercise in self-
determination, in that the people expressed their desire for the Agreement to 
form the foundation for devolved government and political progress.92 
Rodgers finds that the Agreement “is self-determination,” because of its 
wide public acceptance—as demonstrated through referenda.93  
The involvement of all the people of Ireland signaled that the future of 
self-determination is necessarily an ongoing question, to be jointly 
addressed by the people of both jurisdictions. Indeed, “the Agreement’s 
institutions are being created by the will of the people of Ireland, North and 
South, and not just by the people of Northern Ireland.”94 Mike Ritchie 
expressed a nationalist perspective on this aspect of the Agreement: “[A] 
reading of the Good Friday Agreement shows that the unit of self-
determination is quite clearly the Irish people.”95 Ritchie’s perspective 
                                                                                                                              
90 Colin J. Harvey, The New Beginning: Reconstructing Constitutional Law and 
Democracy in Northern Ireland, in HUMAN RIGHTS, EQUALITY AND DEMOCRATIC 
RENEWAL IN NORTHERN IRELAND 9, 36 (Colin J Harvey ed., 2001). 
91 Bertie Ahern, In Search of Peace: The Fate and Legacy of the Good Friday 
Agreement,  25 HARV. INT’L REV. 26, 27 (2003). 
92 Bell & Cavanaugh, supra note 71, at 1357. 
93 Interview with Bríd Rodgers, supra note 51. 
94 Brendan O’Leary, The Nature of the Agreement, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1628, 1647 
(1998). 
95 Interview with Mike Ritchie, supra note 59. 
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demonstrates the ongoing aspirational value of the Agreement; it is not only 
a means of establishing and institutionalising the peace process, but also 
sets a foundation for broader social change, including the realisation of self-
determination. 
B. Key Provisions of the Good Friday Agreement and “Constructive 
Ambiguity”  
The Good Friday Agreement begins with a declaration by all the 
negotiating parties of their support for the negotiated provisions—as a basis 
on which to build reconciliation and a new, shared future.96 The negotiating 
parties then endorse the decision of the British and Irish governments to: 
(i) recognise the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised 
by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its 
status, whether they prefer to continue to support the Union with 
Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland; 
(ii) recognise that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, 
by agreement between the two parts respectively and without 
external impediment, to exercise their right of self-determination 
on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and 
South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish, 
accepting that this right must be achieved and exercised with and 
subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of 
Northern Ireland.97 
The effect of these provisions is that the two governments withdraw their 
stake in the future constitutional status of Northern Ireland, and agree that 
any change is entirely subject to the will of the people. In this sense, the 
Agreement represents a modern, democratic approach to sovereignty.98 This 
                                                                                                                              
96 Good Friday Agreement, supra note 8, at 1, Declaration of Support. 
97 Id. at 2. Constitutional Issues [1]. 
98 The Agreement effectively nullifies the effect of the uti possidetis juris principle, 
enabling a change in political borders on the basis of popular agreement. The principle of 
uti possidetis juris has operated to require formerly colonial territories to maintain their 
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shift can put issues of self-determination truly within the hands of the 
people of the North of Ireland. 
The Agreement provides for constitutional change by requiring the 
British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to trigger a poll “if at any 
time it appears likely to him that a majority of those voting would express a 
wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom 
and form part of a united Ireland.”99 
Should a poll be held and fail, at least seven years must pass before 
another poll could be held.100 As yet, no poll has been held and there has 
been no demand made for such a poll because Irish nationalists (and voters 
in favour of the unification of the Irish jurisdictions) remain in the minority 
of voters in the North of Ireland.101 Therefore this element of the Agreement 
remains a largely unexplored—but very important—provision with regards 
to self-determination. 
The Agreement also acknowledges the right of the people of the North of 
Ireland to identify and be recognised as British or Irish or both, regardless 
of any potential future change in the territory’s constitutional status.102 This 
provision is important for Irish nationalists now, considering their 
experience of systemic discrimination on the basis of their communal 
identity. It may be of great significance to British unionists in a potential 
future united Ireland. In that case, the protection for self-identification set 
out in the Agreement would require sensitive and creative methods of state-
                                                                                                                              
colonial borders upon the achievement of independent statehood. Frontier Dispute Case 
(Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali) 1986 I.C.J. 554 (Dec. 22). 
99 Good Friday Agreement, supra note 8, at 2. Constitutional Issues, Schedule 1 [2]. 
100 Id. at 2. Constitutional Issues, Schedule 1 [3]. 
101 According to the 2012 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, 22 percent of people 
over the age of 18 describe themselves as nationalist. This is compared to 28 percent who 
describe themselves as unionist, and 47 percent who do not describe themselves as either 
unionist or nationalist. See Community Relations: Identity, Northern Ireland Life and 
Times Survey, ACCESS RESEARCH KNOWLEDGE,  http://www.ark.ac.uk/sol/surveys/ 
community_relations/time_series/CRencyidentity.htm (last updated Jun. 5, 2013). 
102 Good Friday Agreement, supra note 8, at 2. Constitutional Issues [1] (vi). 
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building and governance to ensure that a British minority in Ireland would 
not suffer systemic discrimination. 
Strand One of the Agreement provides for the establishment of a 
consociational Northern Ireland Assembly.103 The Assembly exercises 
devolved powers in the areas of agriculture, culture, education, 
employment, trade, environment, finance, health, social services, and—
since 2010—policing and justice.104 Powers in other areas are reserved by 
the British government in Westminster. The rules of the Assembly are 
designed to ensure cross-community participation and support for 
legislation and executive decisions. Certain key decisions may only be 
taken with either a majority of all members voting, including a majority of 
members of both unionist and nationalist designation, or a 60 percent 
majority of all members voting, including at least 40 percent of members 
from both unionist and nationalist designations.105 A First Minister and 
Deputy First Minister, elected from the two largest parties in the Assembly, 
are jointly responsible for overseeing the exercise of executive powers by 
Ministers, who are in turn elected by proportional representation.106 
Strand Two of the Agreement aims to strengthen cooperation between the 
northern and southern Irish jurisdictions through a North-South Ministerial 
Council. This Council comprises members of the executive governments of 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, who meet together regularly 
to cooperate on matters of mutual concern and cross-border issues.107 The 
six areas of cooperation currently include agriculture, education, 
environment, health, tourism, and transport.108 There have been several 
                                                                                                                              
103 Id. at 3. Strand One. 
104 Devolution Settlement: Northern Ireland, supra note 70. 
105 Good Friday Agreement, supra note 8, at 3. Strand One [5] (d) (i), (ii). 
106 Id. at 3. Strand One [14]–[25]. 
107 Id. at 4. Strand Two. 
108 See Areas of Cooperation, NORTH SOUTH MINISTERIAL COUNCIL, http://www. 
northsouthministerialcouncil.org/index/areas-of-co-operation.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 
2009). 
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periods since the Assembly’s establishment when it has been suspended, 
due to disagreements between parties, and during these periods the 
Ministerial Council has not functioned according to its remit. 
Strand Three of the Agreement establishes a British-Irish Council, which 
aims to further relationships and cooperation between the British and Irish 
governments, as well as with the devolved governments in Northern 
Ireland, Scotland, and Wales.109 Strand Three also establishes a British-Irish 
Intergovernmental Conference, which brings together Ministers of each 
government. Meetings are sometimes convened to enable the Irish 
government to put forward views and proposals on matters that are not 
devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly, but are of special interest to the 
Irish state.110 These measures have been recognised as distinctive and 
significant in relation to self-determination under international law. 
According to Geoff Gilbert, Colin Warbrick, and Dominic McGoldrick, 
“the level of participation for the minority group and especially the kin-
State is more than is required by any international instrument.”111 Again, 
this demonstrates the capacity of the Agreement to put issues of self-
determination into the hands of the peoples involved. 
Essential to the Good Friday Agreement are the provisions concerning 
protection of human rights. These provisions particularly emphasise values 
of equality, non-sectarianism, freedom of religious and political expression, 
and non-discrimination.112 The British government pledged to incorporate 
into Northern Ireland law the European Convention on Human Rights, and 
to establish the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and an 
                                                                                                                              
109 Good Friday Agreement, supra note 8, at 5. Strand Three. 
110 Id. at 5. Strand Three, British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference [5]. 
111 Geoff Gilbert, et al., The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement, Minority Rights and 
Self-Determination, 47 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 943, 949 (1998). 
112 Good Friday Agreement, supra note 8, at 6. Rights, Safeguards and Equality of 
Opportunity [1]. 
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Equality Commission.113 The Irish government committed to establishing 
an equivalent Human Rights Commission.114 The Agreement emphasises 
the importance of reconciliation and of acknowledging the experiences of 
victims of conflict.115 According to Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams, the 
Agreement provides a “peaceful and democratic” way to achieve a “citizen-
centred, rights-based society.”116 The Agreement’s provisions on human 
rights should be read in the context of its recognition of the right to self-
determination,117 which is more broadly recognised as the foundation 
principle for the contemporary human rights framework under international 
law.118 
The Agreement has been described by Bell and Cavanaugh as an exercise 
in “constructive ambiguity.”119 This is a political device used to gain 
agreement on a disputed text. While in this case the constructive ambiguity 
of the Agreement produced positive results in terms of the peace process, it 
also created some uncertainty in relation to key terms.120 The central 
ambiguity in the Good Friday Agreement relates to the “unit” of self-
determination that it is said to create. The Agreement first vests a decision 
on future constitutional change in “the majority of the people of Northern 
Ireland.”121 However, in the next paragraph, the Agreement identifies self-
determination as a right to be exercised by “the people of the island of 
Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively and without 
external impediment.”122 
                                                                                                                              
113 Id. at 6. Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity [2], [5], [6]. 
114 Id. at 6. Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity [9]. 
115 Id. at 6. Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity [11]–[13]. 
116 Adams, supra note 87. 
117 Good Friday Agreement, supra note 8, at article 1 (ii). 
118 Espiell, supra note 17; ANAYA, supra note 17. 
119 See generally Bell & Cavanaugh, supra note 71. 
120 Id. at 1356. 
121 Good Friday Agreement, supra note 8, at 2. Constitutional Issues [2] (i). 
122 Id. at 2. Constitutional Issues [2] (ii). 
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While these provisions appear to conflict, the use of these two different 
categories need not be interpreted as a source of confusion. Bell and 
Cavanaugh argue that reference to the two competing groups boosts the 
legitimacy of the Agreement, and confirms the right of all the people of the 
island to involvement in future self-determination solutions.123 In giving 
both the people of the North of Ireland and the people of the island of 
Ireland a place within this central provision, the Agreement acknowledges 
that each jurisdiction has unique features, and that the two must collaborate 
if constitutional change is to occur. The constructive ambiguity of these 
essential provisions also enables either of the two potential future 
outcomes—continued union with Britain or the creation of a united 
Ireland—to be achieved in the context of the legal protections offered by the 
Agreement. 
IV. ASSESSING THE CAPACITY OF THE AGREEMENT TO PROMOTE A 
JUST PEACE  
The Good Friday Agreement makes no assumptions about future 
constitutional settlements, but instead offers either the continuation of the 
union with Britain or the establishment of a united Ireland as alternative 
future outcomes. This flexibility is bolstered by the commitments made by 
the two governments that they have no vested interest in either outcome, 
and that they are bound to facilitate whichever outcome expresses the will 
of the majority of the people.124 Therefore, the Agreement is a transitional 
rather than a final settlement. It was intended to bring an end to violent 
political conflict while enabling the different communities to continue to 
debate their future status through democratic means.125 As discussed below, 
the Agreement does not set out a comprehensive framework for conflict 
                                                                                                                              
123 Bell & Cavanaugh, supra note 71, at 1360–61. 
124 Good Friday Agreement, supra note 8, at 2. Constitutional Issues [1]. 
125 Harvey, supra note 90, at 34. 
568 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
LAW, PEACE, AND VIOLENCE 
resolution or reconciliation, thus demonstrating that a dialogue on 
establishing a just peace must be maintained. 
The openness of the Agreement necessitates an ongoing conversation 
regarding the constitutional arrangements on the island of Ireland, and how 
potential change might affect its people. Discussion regarding whether and 
how change might occur in Ireland is essential to avoid extending the 
suffering imposed on Irish nationalists through partition and colonial 
domination to future generations. This proposed conversation requires 
contributions influenced by international legal considerations—particularly 
the right of self-determination. Indeed, it has been argued that international 
law explains the Good Friday Agreement more effectively than other legal 
approaches.126 In the following sections, I note several matters of priority in 
relation to the development of a just peace in Northern Ireland: the need to 
acknowledge colonialism and provide for transitional justice, the full 
significance of the consent principle in the Agreement, and the potential for 
an inclusive self-determination solution in Ireland. 
A. The Need to Acknowledge Colonialism and Provide for Transitional 
Justice  
In Section II of this article, I argued that the colonial experience of Irish 
nationalists must be acknowledged in order to move forward with a truthful 
awareness of their historical context, and to progress the essential debate on 
Ireland’s constitutional future. While the Good Friday Agreement appears 
to respect the legitimacy of two competing political aspirations—British 
unionism and Irish nationalism—it does not name colonialism as a 
fundamental contextual experience for the territory or its peoples. This is a 
troubling gap in the Agreement, as is the absence of acknowledgment that 
the British state had an active role in the conflict in Ireland. 
                                                                                                                              
126 Campbell et al., supra note 39, at 326. 
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However, considering that the primary goal at the time of negotiations 
was to facilitate the end to violent conflict, it is unsurprising that the 
Agreement is flawed in these ways. In McAliskey’s conception, the 
negotiations leading to the Agreement were concerned with how the 
conflict “could be managed out of existence,” rather than with conflict 
resolution.127 This assertion is supported by the findings of Campbell, Ní 
Aoláin, and Harvey that the Agreement deals little with the past and the 
legacies of the conflict,128 but rather aims to transform a violent conflict into 
a political conflict.129 Cillian McGrattan concurs, finding that historic 
wrongs, victims, reconciliation, and truth-telling have been largely 
marginalised in the Agreement and its operation post-1998.130 In the future, 
effective transitional justice processes will be required in order to 
adequately acknowledge matters of colonialism and self-determination, and 
to facilitate the establishment of a just peace in the North of Ireland. 
As discussed in the introduction of this article, transitional justice is a set 
of scholarly inquiries concerned with societies in post-conflict transition.131 
Transitional justice inquiries focus on human rights and seek redemptive 
visions for justice after conflict.132 Justice is conceived of as a conditional, 
rather than an absolute quality; that is to say, what a society deems just 
during post-conflict transition will depend on the nature of the injustices 
perpetrated during the conflict.133 In this context, truth-telling and dealing 
with the past become central concerns for transitional justice enquiries.134 
                                                                                                                              
127 Interview with Bernadette McAliskey, supra note 67. 
128 Campbell et al., supra note 39, at 339. 
129 Harvey, supra note 90, at 34. 
130 McGrattan, supra note 9, at 400. 
131 Boraine, supra note 35. 
132 TEITEL, supra note 37, at 228. 
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134 Christine Bell, Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
1095, 1097 (2002). 
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It is not possible to adequately address the range of transitional justice 
enquiries relating to Northern Ireland in this article. However, it is 
important to explore truth-telling and reconciliation. Efforts to develop such 
mechanisms have arguably been hampered by the lack of acknowledgment 
of the colonial experience or the self-determination claim of Irish nationalist 
people in the North of Ireland. The peace process in Ireland has not led the 
British state to address its active involvement in the conflict. As efforts to 
develop transitional justice processes have advanced since 1998, “the 
United Kingdom has sought to contain the implications of the Northern 
Ireland transitionary process to the geographical location of the conflict.”135 
In 2007, legislation was passed at Westminster that limits the Commission’s 
investigative powers. The legislation prevents the Commission from 
investigating any intelligence services or their members, or from inquiring 
into whether intelligence services have violated the human rights of 
individuals in the community.136 This parliamentary limitation is 
characteristic of the British state’s long-standing position that it serves as 
the neutral arbiter between two “warring tribes,” or what is known as the 
“community relations” analysis of the conflict in Ireland.137 Britain’s 
projection of itself as an arbiter and promoter of equality138 significantly 
hampers its capacity to transform the social institutions of Northern 
Ireland139 through which colonialism has been perpetuated, and thus 
hampers its capacity to help facilitate the establishment of a just peace. 
                                                                                                                              
135 Fionnuala Ní Aoláin & Colm Campbell, The Paradox of Transition in Conflicted 
Democracies, 27 HUM. RTS Q. 127, 204 (2005). 
136 Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007 (UK) (UK ed. 2007) s69B. 
137 Bill Rolston, Assembling the Jigsaw: Truth, Justice and Transition in the North of 
Ireland, 44 RACE & CLASS 87, 88–89 (2002). 
138 Mike Tomlinson, Walking Backwards into the Sunset: British Policy and the 
Insecurity of Northern Ireland, in RETHINKING NORTHERN IRELAND 94, 95 (David 
Miller ed. 1998). 
139 Ní Aoláin & Campbell, supra note 135, at 203–04. 
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A mechanism for truth-telling and addressing the past would significantly 
bolster the capacity of the Agreement to promote true peace and 
reconciliation. Indeed, former British cabinet minister and Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland, Shaun Woodward, wrote in 2014 that the peace 
process can always unravel, “[s]o long as Northern Ireland avoids settling 
on a mechanism to deal justly and fairly with its past.”140 Kelman argues 
that the process of identity change, which is essential to conflict resolution, 
requires, among other things, “a common moral basis for peace . . . 
consistent with the principles of fairness and attainable justice” and 
“admitting the other’s truth into one’s own narrative.”141 Woodward 
recommended that the British government fund a review of potential 
mechanisms, and commit (in advance of the review) to putting its 
recommendations to a referendum.142 In 2007, the British and Northern Irish 
governments established a Consultative Group on the Past, chaired by the 
former Primate of the Church of Ireland143 and a former Catholic priest. The 
Group delivered its report in 2009,144 and recommended a raft of measures 
that could together have established “an overall mechanism for dealing with 
the past.”145 Instead, the report was met with summary rejection from the 
British and Northern Irish governments and its recommendations have not 
been adopted.146 
                                                                                                                              
140 Shaun Woodward, Gerry Adam’s Arrest Shows It’s Time to Deal with Northern 
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Should the peace process develop to a point of supporting a truth and 
reconciliation process, international oversight would be essential,147 as 
became clear in the aftermath of the release of the report of the Consultative 
Group on the Past in 2009. Public and political reactions to this report have 
been volatile. Former British unionist leader David Trimble found offensive 
the notion that the families of all those killed during the conflict should 
receive a compensation payment, as this proposal equated the experiences 
of victims’ families regardless of whether the victims were civilians, police, 
soldiers, or paramilitaries.148 The Consultative Group rebutted this view in 
its report, which concluded that any hierarchy of victims of the conflict is 
sectarian,149 and ought to be rejected to prevent the politicisation of 
victimhood.150 However, some nationalist politicians also argued that the 
Group’s proposals were inherently flawed because the Group’s members 
were appointed by the British government, its report failed to implicate the 
British state as a participant in the conflict, and it appeared to rule out the 
possibility of independent internationally convened inquiries into 
controversial incidents.151 
The need for a holistic approach to the peace process in Ireland—that is, 
one that accounts for rights issues and reconciliation issues—was supported 
by recent qualitative research conducted in Northern Ireland with rights and 
                                                                                                                              
147 See, e.g., UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and 
Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, Office of the High Commissions for Human Rights, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/TruthJusticeReparation/Pages/Index.aspx (last visited 
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150 Id. at 68. 
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http://republican-news.org; Press Release, Sinn Féin General Election, Ó Caoláin and 
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reconciliation advocates. In this study, Maggie Beirne and Colin Knox note 
that the rights and reconciliation approaches are each limited in terms of 
their capacities to produce true resolution of the conflict in Northern 
Ireland.152 They note that advocates for human rights-focused approaches to 
peace-building can appear too focused on international legal standards to 
“successfully affect local realities and divisions.”153 Further, Beirne and 
Knox find that advocates who privilege reconciliation over rights may focus 
on the bottom-up generation of new relationships, yet fail to adequately 
address the “power differentials between those being reconciled” or “the 
role of the state in creating and maintaining divisions.”154 Beirne and Knox 
argue for a collaborative approach to peace building between rights and 
reconciliation advocates and movements in Northern Ireland in a way that 
mirrors my argument that the peace process must be pursued in the context 
of the fundamental issues of colonialism, self-determination, and 
transitional justice. 
B. Recognising the Full Significance of the Consent Principle 
The “consent principle,” essential to the Good Friday Agreement, means 
that the constitutional status of Northern Ireland is no longer—at least in 
legal terms—subject to the will of the British state. Instead, it is said to 
depend on the will of a majority of its people, and requires Britain to give 
effect to any future change it may wish to make.155 Campbell, Ní Aoláin, 
and Harvey argue that this principle demonstrates that the Agreement 
makes a creative contribution to the development of the international law on 
the transfer of sovereignty: “No longer is territorial cession about the 
transfer of sovereignty by means of an agreement between ceding and 
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acquiring state, but rather the ceding of the decisive power to citizenry 
itself, with the prior consent of the implicated states.”156 
The British state’s acceptance of this shift, enabling the citizenry to 
exercise control of constitutional and territorial status through elections, “is 
a radical reconfiguration of both the theory and practice of state 
formation.”157 It is an official acknowledgment that Northern Ireland has a 
right to secede and join a union with the Republic of Ireland, if that is the 
wish of the people.158 It is important that the consent principle be 
understood in this sense, rather than confined by an interpretation that 
emphasises the protection that the consent principle offers to the preferences 
of the British unionist majority. 
It is certainly true that the consent principle operates to ensure that 
unionists cannot be forced into a united Ireland while they remain a 
majority in Northern Ireland. Some Irish nationalists would regard the 
consent principle as the equivalent of the unionist “veto,”159 which militant 
nationalism always resisted during the political conflict. Prior to the 
development of consociational mechanisms through the Good Friday 
Agreement, unionists were seen to be exercising a veto over claims for Irish 
unification, and were supported in this through the force of the British 
state.160 Indeed, some Irish nationalists opposed to the Agreement continue 
to argue that their former comrades, many now Sinn Féin politicians and 
                                                                                                                              
156 Id. at 329–30. 
157 Id. at 330. 
158 O’Leary, supra note 94, at 1647. 
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members of the Northern Ireland Assembly, have accepted a unionist veto 
despite claiming they would never do so during the conflict.161 
However, the consent principle may be interpreted in a more positive 
light from the Irish nationalist perspective. For example, Rodgers believes 
the significance of the Good Friday Agreement is that it recognises the 
legitimacy of both nationalist and unionist perspectives.162 She adds that by 
incorporating the consent principle, the Agreement enables both nationalists 
and unionists to advocate peacefully for their desired ends.163 The consent 
principle undoubtedly represents a compromise on the part of nationalists, 
some of whom previously did not accept the need to secure majority 
support for constitutional change, instead arguing that British rule in the 
North of Ireland is inherently wrong and ought to be immediately ended.164 
However, alongside the consent principle’s majority protection offered to 
the British unionist community, the principle’s complementary and novel 
protection is now offered to Irish nationalists in the Agreement through 
Britain’s hugely significant commitment to respect whatever choice the 
people make. This commitment is yet to be tested, but Britain has 
committed itself in formal legal terms. This represents a massive shift in the 
British position, considering both its historical reluctance to accept the 
weakening of its empire and its vehement and long-term opposition to 
militant Irish republicanism. 
Importantly, the notion that future constitutional change will only come 
through political rather than violent means was a key factor in securing 
                                                                                                                              
161 See, e.g.,  McGuinness at Centre of Storm, IRISH REPUBLICAN NEWS, Mar. 13, 2009, 
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majority support for the popular referenda that confirmed the Agreement.165 
It was this shift that enabled veteran Irish nationalist leader Gerry Adams to 
conclude: “The Good Friday Agreement is the people’s agreement. It does 
not belong to the elites. It must be defended, implemented and 
promoted.”166 Furthermore, it is this type of interpretation of the Agreement 
and its potential that can absorb an acknowledgment of the colonial 
experience of Irish nationalists and their legitimate claim to self-
determination, while simultaneously promoting the achievement of a just 
peace in Ireland. 
C. The Potential for an Inclusive, All-Island Self-determination 
Solution 
The Good Friday Agreement provides legal and political confirmation 
that Irish unification is a potential future outcome. According to Bertie 
Ahern, the Agreement makes the people truly sovereign for the first time, 
and establishes a mechanism of consent through which the people of the 
island may choose to exercise the right of self-determination and unite as 
one sovereign Irish state.167 Therefore, the Agreement has the capacity to 
enable an eventual all-island self-determination settlement in three senses. 
First, any future change will be required to consider the interests of all 
communities on the island. Second, and crucially for Irish nationalists, the 
unification of the two jurisdictions is now accepted as a legitimate political 
goal. Third, the Agreement confirms that nationalists are equally entitled to 
advance their political aspirations through peaceful means.168 
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 The island status of Ireland is significant in terms of international opinion 
regarding the success of the settlement contained in the Good Friday 
Agreement. Guelke’s argument that the current borders and status of 
Northern Ireland lack international legitimacy169 has often been cited.170 He 
notes that the all-Ireland dimensions of the Agreement—for example, the 
North-South Ministerial Council and cross-border implementation bodies—
were accepted internationally as guarantees that the Agreement was not 
partitionist and would not stand as an obstacle to “the eventual outcome of a 
united Ireland.”171 Guelke’s view demonstrates why the cross-border 
dimensions of the Agreement, which confirm that the Agreement is 
concerned with the self-determination of all the people of the island, were 
so fundamental to securing Irish nationalist agreement. In responding to the 
1995 Forum for Peace and Reconciliation, an important consultation 
process conducted three years before the Agreement was reached, Sinn Féin 
stated: “What is required is a new and imaginative approach which tilts the 
balance away from the prohibitive and negative power of veto towards the 
positive power of consent, of considering consent, of negotiating 
consent.”172 As discussed above, the Agreement now provides for such a 
positive conception of the role of consent in future constitutional debates. 
The mass support for the peaceful political process set out in the Good 
Friday Agreement demonstrates popular acceptance of the importance of 
inclusivity in relation to self-determination in contemporary Ireland. An 
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inclusive approach does not require a particular community to abandon its 
own history or aspirations, as I have argued in this article in relation to Irish 
nationalists. However, as O’Connor explains, inclusiveness does require a 
more plural conception of self-determination: 
[Y]ou put everything that’s important to you in your life into bags, 
and that’s your history and you shouldn’t leave that behind. We 
need to come at it as who we are [as Irish nationalists] and 
recognise that it’s important who we are, but also make space. So 
someone will suggest that in a new structure [for example, a united 
Ireland] unionists can maintain a British passport—sure, why not? 
That doesn’t take away my right. I almost find self-determination a 
more useful phrase in describing what I want than a united 
Ireland—a united Ireland seems to be saying “I want a unit, that 
we control,” which could seem exclusive. Self-determination 
means that Protestants, Catholics, working class, middle class . . .  
self-determine their lives.173 
This approach would necessitate the preservation of the minority rights 
protections incorporated in the Agreement in any new constitutional 
arrangement. The aim would be to ensure that Irish self-determination 
means the highest possible level of self-determination and rights protections 
for everyone on the island, including those who do not express an Irish 
national identity. 
Following the Good Friday Agreement, and as a demonstration of its 
willingness to respect the choice of a majority in Northern Ireland, the UK 
Parliament repealed the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 (UK).174 This 
statute had enabled the partition of Ireland. In turn, the electorate of the 
Republic of Ireland agreed through referendum to change Articles 2 and 3 
of the Irish Constitution, as a condition of the voters’ acceptance of the 
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Agreement.175 Article 2 of the Constitution had previously asserted a 
territorial claim over the whole of the island of Ireland.176 Following the 
post-Agreement amendment, Article 2 now affirms “the entitlement and 
birthright of every person born in the island of Ireland, which includes its 
islands and seas, to be part of the Irish Nation.”177 The earlier form of 
Article 3 anticipated “the re-integration of the national territory” and 
affirmed “the right of the Parliament and Government established by this 
Constitution to exercise jurisdiction over the whole of that territory.”178 
Article 3 no longer claims the right of the Irish Parliament to govern the 
whole island. Instead it recognises 
the firm will of the Irish nation, in harmony and friendship, to unite 
all the people who share the territory of the island of Ireland, in all 
the diversity of their identities and traditions, recognising that a 
united Ireland shall be brought about only by peaceful means with 
the consent of a majority of the people, democratically expressed, 
in both jurisdictions in the island.179 
Arguably, these changes were essential to facilitate an inclusive future 
self-determination solution for Ireland. According to Kieran McEvoy, the 
changes encouraged nationalists to “think more deeply about 
accommodating unionist tradition within the island of Ireland” and to 
recognise “that self-determination is not simply about the expression of 
one’s own rights, but is about the accommodation of the rights of the 
other.”180 Coughlan agrees that the Agreement and consequent amendments 
to the Irish Constitution ensure the extension of minority rights to British 
                                                                                                                              
175 These changes were made through the Statute Law Revision Act 2007 (Ireland). 
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179 Id. at Article 3. 
180 Interview with Professor Kieran McEvoy, supra note 60. 
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unionist people, should the Irish jurisdictions be united.181 These 
developments might, for example, enable unionists “to retain British 
citizenship as a complex of legal rights” within an Irish state.182 
In Part IV of this article, I have argued that the twin goals of justice and 
peace may be pursued through three parallel endeavours: (1) acknowledging 
colonialism and its impacts in Ireland, and providing for transitional justice 
in that context; (2) exploring the full significance of the consent principle in 
the Good Friday Agreement; and (3) considering the possibility of an 
inclusive self-determination resolution in Ireland. Foundation transitional 
justice theorist Ruti Teitel has demonstrated that post conflict transitions 
“imply paradigm shifts in the conception of justice.”183 The processes I have 
advocated for in this article have the potential to encourage such paradigm 
shifts and encourage the development of a peace process that looks to the 
past and its injustices, while also aiming for a new dispensation for peace in 
the future. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In his seminal book States of Denial, Stanley Cohen asked: “what do we 
do with our knowledge about the suffering of others, and what does this 
knowledge do to us?”184 This article has attended to Cohen’s concern in 
relation to the Irish peace process by positioning the contemporary colonial 
experience of Irish nationalists in the North of Ireland as an essential 
starting point in an honest evaluation of self-determination in Ireland. The 
colonial experience of Irish nationalists has inflicted injustice and poses an 
obstacle to the achievement of a just peace. The fact that neither the colonial 
experience of Irish nationalists nor the role of the British state in the conflict 
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has yet been adequately acknowledged demonstrates that the Irish peace 
process has not achieved conflict resolution or reconciliation.185 
However, the Good Friday Agreement is a living document, capable of 
facilitating flexible solutions to a potential constitutional change in Ireland. 
It has encouraged sections of the Irish nationalist community to shift from 
political violence towards negotiation as a means of furthering their self-
determination claims. Representatives of the Irish and British communities 
now sit at the same table, a circumstance that would have been unthinkable 
20 years ago. The Agreement can be implemented in the future to develop 
conflict resolution and reconciliation opportunities, including a truth-telling 
mechanism, which in turn can generate transitional justice. As demonstrated 
in the final two sections of this article, confronting the experience of 
colonialism need not stand in the way of developing an inclusive self-
determination solution in Ireland, and ought not stand in the way of 
establishing a just peace. 
I opened this article with a reference to Freedland’s recent argument that 
the people of Northern Ireland face a choice between justice or peace: “We 
may want both; we may cry out for both. But the bleak truth is we cannot 
have both.”186 My argument is that this type of peace-justice binary is 
defeatist and unproductive. Of course, the peace and the justice that can be 
achieved in the North of Ireland may prove imperfect. However, just as 
relative peace is preferable to widespread conflict, so is an honest effort at 
delivering transitional justice preferable to marginalising truth and ignoring 
injustice in the hope that wounds will miraculously heal themselves. 
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